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I.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations that are
solely determinative of the issue on appeal.
II.
ARGUMENT
A.

CVTS FAILURE TO PROVIDE MRS. JOHNSON WITH REASONABLE
ADVANCE NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO REQUIRE STRICT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE TERMS OF ITS NOTICE OF DEFAULT IS FATAL TO ITS ABILITY
TO SUMMARILY FORFEIT MRS. JOHNSON'S INTEREST IN THE LEASE
AGREEMENT.
1.

The No-Waiver Provision in the Lease Agreement Could Be Waived, and Was
in Fact Waived. Bv CVI.

CVI concedes that it agreed to relax, and in fact relaxed, die fifteen day cure period
specified by its Notice of Default.

(Response Brief at 8, 9 and 13.)

It does so by

acknowledging that it accorded Mrs. Johnson "a tremendous amount of indulgence," engaged
in a "pattern" of "try[ing] to work with [Mrs. Johnson]," and "allowed Mrs. Johnson a degree
of tolerance." (Id.) In an effort to escape the obvious characterization that its agreed-upon
forbearance constitutes a waiver of its right to require strict and immediate compliance with the
Notice of Default, CVI invokes the no-waiver provision of the Lease Agreement. (Id. at 13,
14.) CVI's reliance on that provision, however, is misplaced.

1

"It is a well-established rule of law that parties to a written contract may modify, waive,
or make new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract designed to hamper such freedom."
Prince v. R. C. TolmanConstr. Co., 610 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 1980) (quoting Davis v. Pavne
&Dav. 348 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah I960)). As this court has stated, f,[p]arties to a contract may,
by mutual consent, modify any or all of a contract, even if the contract itself contains a
provision to the contrary." Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah
App. 1988).
The rationale for this principle is that " . . . there is nothing so sacrosanct about having
entered into one agreement that it will prevent the parties entering into any such change,
modification, extension or addition to their arrangement for doing business with each other that
they may mutually agree." PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish & Chips, 502 P.2d 562,
563 (Utah 1972). Thus,
While parties to a contract are free to [ignore its provisions], they
must also understand that they may bear the consequences of such
disregard when breach becomes a fact of life. As a general rule,
if the parties mutually adopt a mode of performing their contract
differing from its strict terms, or if they mutually relax its terms
by adopting a loose mode of executing it, neither party can go
back upon the past and insist upon a breach because it was not
fulfilled according to its letter.
Ouinn Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Const., 597 P.2d 945, 951 (Wyo. 1979) (emphasis in
original).
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Numerous commentators and other courts have recognized that contractual provisions that
purport to eliminate the possibility of the parties' waiver are not enforceable. According to
Professor Corbin:
In like manner, a provision that an express condition of a promise
or promises in a contract cannot be eliminated by waiver, or by
conduct constituting an estoppel, is wholly ineffective. The
promisor still has the power to waive the condition, or by his
conduct to estop himself from insisting upon it, to the same extent
that he would have had this power if there had been no such
provision.
3A Corbin on Contracts. § 763, p. 531 (rev. ed. 1960).
The Utah Supreme Court endorsed this principle in Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co.. 146
P.2d 284 (Utah 1944). In that case, the parties entered into a contract for the purchase and sale
of an automobile. The contract contained both a time of the essence provision and a no-waiver
provision. Several of the buyer's payments during the first twelve months of the contract were
made as much as 30 days late. After accepting the first 12 payments, the seller rejected the next
payment on the basis that it was too late.

Shortly thereafter, the seller repossessed the

automobile and sought a deficiency judgment against the buyer. In affirming the trial court's
decision that the seller had waived strict compliance despite the existence of the no-waiver
provision to the contrary, the court stated "the provision that a waiver of any breach of the
contract shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any subsequent failure of strict compliance with
any and every term of the contract, as well as any other term of the contract, could be modified
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by agreement of the parties." 146 P.2d at 286 (quoting Beardslee v. North Pacific Finance
Corp.. 296 P. 155, 158 (Wash. 1931)).
Numerous other courts in a multitude of jurisdictions have reached the same result.
Fisher v. Tiffin. 551 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ore. 1976) (a "non-waiver provision of the contract can
itself be waived by the conduct of the vendor."); Sagson Co. v. Weiss. 374 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89
(N. Y. 1975) ("a no waiver clause of this character does not apply to a claim of waiver by open
possession."); Searoad Shipping Co. v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.. 361 F.2d 833, 837,
n.18 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Corbin makes very clear that neither the parol evidence rule [citation
omitted], the statute of frauds [citation omitted], nor express provision in the written contract
against waiver by subsequent oral agreement or conduct [citation omitted] prevent the
introduction of evidence that a party to the contract by subsequent conduct or agreement — oral
or written — waived a condition to its performance of the contract."); Bettelheim v. Hagstrom
Food Stores. 249 P.2d 301, 305 (Cal. 1952) (presence of no-waiver provision in contract can
itself be waived).
These principles belie CVI's claim that because the Lease Agreement contains "an
unequivocal non-waiver provision," CVI was incapable of waiving its right to require Mrs.
Johnson to comply strictly with the Notice of Default. (Response Brief at 7, 13.) The mere
presence of the no-waiver provision cannot insulate CVI from the reality that by its conduct CVI
relaxed - waived - its right to require Mrs. Johnson to comply strictly and immediately with
the terms of the Notice of Default. In the final analysis, the no-waiver provision cannot be used
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as a type of legal alchemy to magically transform conduct that plainly constitutes waiver to
conduct that the law overlooks. The district erred in failing to recognize this principle.
2.

None of the Cases on Which CVI Relies to Justify Its Forfeiture of
Mrs, Johnson's Interest in the Lease Agreement on Less than Five Davs
Advance Notice Remotely Supports the Trial Court's Decision.

The record in this case is undisputed that "right around the end of July [1993]", CVTs
manager told Mrs. Johnson " . . . we could not work with her any longer and that we would be
evicting if things didn't get going at the end of July," see Tr. at R. 750, 751, and that less than
five days later on August 3, 1993 — one day after it accepted Mrs. Johnson's rent payment check
- CVI served Mrs. Johnson with its Notice of Termination. (Tr. at R. 655, 700, 704, 706.)
In an effort to justify the legal sufficiency of this plainly limited amount of time, CVI cites two
principal cases which it contends supports its position. Those cases, however, either actually
support Mrs. Johnson's claim or are readily distinguishable from the facts of this case.
For example, CVI places considerable reliance on Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart. 195 P.2d
748 (Utah 1948) (Response Brief at 9-15.) However, in that case, the Utah Supreme Court held
that a period of twenty-three days for a buyer to finally cure its default after a two year period
of "many lenities" from the seller was reasonable. 195 P.2d at 751. By contrast, in the case
at bar, Mrs. Johnson had less than five davs to cure after the previous seventy days of "lenities."
There is no Utah case that upholds the legal sufficiency of such a brief final cure period.
Moreover, nothing in Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah. Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1976) supports CVI's position. (Response Brief at 15, 16.) There is no indication that the
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lessee in that case ever raised the claim or defense that the notice of forfeiture that the lessor
served five months after the expiration of the initial thirty day cure period violated the legal
requirement that the lessor provide reasonable advance notice of its intent to require strict
performance.1 In the case at bar, Mrs. Johnson has in fact raised this issue.2 The district court
erred in not applying it to the undisputed facts of this case.
CONCLUSION
For nearly fifty years, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that once a promisee
relaxes the requirement of strict compliance, it cannot insist unilaterally on such performance
without providing its promisor with reasonable advance notice. (See Opening Brief at 8-11).
This settled principle of contract law has been applied consistently to prevent a promisee from
unfairly exploiting its promisor by suddenly and unexpectedly demanding immediate strict
performance after a lengthy period of forbearance. Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah
App. 1987); Morris v. Svkes. 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d
345, 347 (Utah 1980); Fuhriman v. Bissegger. 375 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1962); Pacific Dev. Co.

1

CVI itself recognizes that the lessee in that case never raised the claim that Mrs. Johnson has asserted in this
case when it states "[i]t must be assumed that the lessor in Pingree neither intended nor indicated that it would waive
its right to declare forfeiture." (Response Brief at 15) (emphasis added). Nothing in Pingree supports that
assumption.
2

CVI appears to imply that Mrs. Johnson never adequately raised or preserved this issue for appeal. (Response
Brief at 8, n.4). That implication is unfounded. The trial transcript clearly reflects that this issue was the principal
focus of Mrs. Johnson's case at trial. (See generally Tr. at R. 687-704, 746-760.) It also reflects that it was the
principal focus of Mrs. Johnson's counsel's motion to dismiss after the completion of CVI's case in chief and his
summation. (See generally R. at Tr. 764-74, 791-94.) The issue was preserved in both Mrs. Johnson's Docketing
Statement and in her response to CVI's Motion for Summary Affirmance. Finally, it was clearly identified in Mrs.
Johnson's Opening Brief. (Opening Brief at 7-11.)
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v. Stewart. 195 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1948). The trial court committed reversible error in
refusing to apply this fundamental principle of contract law to the undisputed facts of this case.
This Court accordingly should reverse and vacate CVTs Judgment and remand the case with
instructions to enter Judgment in favor of Mrs. Johnson for all attorneys' fees and costs that she
incurred to enforce her rights under the Lease Agreement.
DATED this

/«/ day of July, 1995.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

>hn T> Anderson
John
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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